Monday, December 1, 2014

Themes

            One thread we see in this section’s readings is a question: is art free from the political world, and if not, what is its relationship? In Plato’s Symposium, we saw addressed art’s potential to be a motivating factor. This, we recognized, can lead to two conclusions: first, art can motivate us to work towards whatever we find beautiful about it; and second, we may be manipulated by artworks, and in turn by artists or other agents—we may face propaganda. The possibility of manipulation may be reduced by contemplation of an artwork, but even then there is no guarantee that one will escape without fulfilling some aspect of someone else’s agenda. If art has the potential to make us the objects of someone else’s will, is it a good thing? I think the risk is worth taking, especially if we train ourselves to be contemplative and aware when we approach artworks.
            Schiller viewed art as necessarily involved in politics, since politics itself lacked the means to achieve its ends. This lack existed due to what Schiller believed to be politics’ primarily imaginary existence—it could posit new ends, make new laws, but could not change what people wanted. There is a sense in which Schiller is simply wrong—many people will obey laws for reasons that have nothing to do with art, and both tyranny and just government may rely on the threat of force to ensure adherence to law (desegregation, for example, required the presence of the national guard). What these conditions imply, however, is the lack of understanding and desire on the part of the citizen, which we hope they would generally have. Of course, understanding all laws is beyond us unless we make it our profession, but a general sense is not outside our grasp. Art, Schiller suggests, helps us to desire a different world and thereby manifest and use the motivation to make it that way.
            Benjamin was concerned with the “aura” of art and the effect of art on the viewer; but to say ‘the viewer’ is misleading, as Benjamin argued that art had moved away from the realm of individual contemplation and into a ‘mass’ possession, something divested of its sacred aura turned into a popular plaything. Benjamin certainly saw the potential for manipulation in film, of the sort we saw in Plato and can imagine in Schiller. Camera work, especially, delimits our view into the movie, but if a movie is working properly, we think only about what is on the screen, not about the fact that it is on the screen because of a choice, that this is a shot, and that this is not an aperspectival view of the world. His suggestion that film invites, indeed causes, distracted attention explains not only many of our problems in the modern world, but how we can easily be manipulated in ways we do not understand. That we become used to engaging in only distracted attention is itself problematic in that it limits our ability to engage contemplatively and intelligently with the problems of the real world and puts the average member of ‘the mass’ at the mercy of someone who has those skills—or at least has the skills to put together a film that manipulates the viewer.
Sontag noted similar issues in his analysis of photography, particularly of framing and the problem of non-intervention—in order to be photographing, one must choose not to intervene in what takes place. Yet the possibility of preparing a shot also exists. The sheer volume of photos available also diminishes the effect of each one, and as eras pass, once-seminal, moving photographs become important only historically, and moving only indirectly or intellectually, but not sentimentally—we gain layers of distance. This problem makes photography self-destruct; it cannot preserve what makes it special and evocative, it is claimed. This is not, I think, true as an extreme; we have seen that photos still do affect people. As far as relevance goes, this, too, is true, and we can see the same issue at stake in the adjustment required for one to really enjoy many older works of literature, that had different horizons of expectations, and even, I would argue, for one to enjoy older paintings, like the unrealistic and somewhat bland paintings that adorn so many religious sites throughout history. Each of these is made more powerful by understanding and contextual awareness; each effect diminishes with the distance between us and it.

Not least among these, Adorno recognized the originally ritual function of art and its role as a sacred object, and discussed art as a kind of ‘negative’ in the sense of photo negativity. The demystification of the artwork via knowledge about it (and perhaps rules of taste, or something similar—a point I must investigate) allows us to justify claims about its artistry. Art is dependent on the world, but the question arises: if art is a negative, does not reality depend on art? To me this suggests the degree to which we shape our world by contemplative fictions, in the intellectual and psychological realm, and the way in which we live according to principles and constructs that are identifiable—even if they are merely a macroscopic picture of what can be defined more mechanically and perhaps without account of agency at a lower level. Art is, at all accounts, tied into reality and truth, but in a way that suggests it both produces interpretation and is itself, of course, produced. Whether or not its interpretation is truthful, or truth-conducive, at any rate, or not is a question all of these authors raise. Another is whether art might not be something to the side of truth—related to it, but not limited to truth or untruth at all.

Reflection 6

Can Art serve a legitimate Moral or Political function without being Propaganda?
Art is more than capable of serving both a political and moral purpose. It is true that some works of art that attempt such a feat can be used as mere propaganda but it is also possible to be used as a political and moral instrument of change. What is it that such artworks do? Artworks that are not used as propaganda but serve a political or moral purpose serve as bridges to get from where one is to where one wants to be. Art is an instrument of change. When societies make laws and when individuals make goals to alter his/her character, there is a current state that is incorrect or wrong and a desire to change to a different/better state. How can the society and the individual make such a transition, and also what methods of transition will actually work? Friedrich Schiller suggests that art is a medium in which to successfully bring about a revolution. He comments the flaws of the French Revolution in particular, stating that it was the correct movement but it was executed poorly in such a way that the original ideals did not stick to the people. What was missing, says Schiller, was art: a peaceful medium that can bring into focus the goals of a movement. Through art one can safely transition between where they are now and where they want to be. The French Revolution, and others like it, implemented force to transition between states which is an ineffective method.

It can be said, then, that art contains a great deal of power and influence. This holds especially true for communities during times of critical political importance and for individuals during sensitive periods of their life. In his Critique of Judgment Kant explains that the experience of art is a subjective one, which can be influenced by outside influences. Art and human thought has evolved in such a way that art cannot be understood in itself. Both philosophers, Benjamin and Adorno, comment on the way that in the past objects which we now call art were enveloped in an “aura”. This aura presents itself as a godlike presence, absorbing the viewer and affecting their beliefs. Both philosophers also discuss the modern age of media and how it has changed the way people interact with art, and this change is not an improvement.

Today’s modern media consists of three unique things which have altered the way people interact with art: Movies/Television, Photographs, and Internet. Photographs are quite interesting because they produce images almost instantly and which such ease. This, combined with the social connectivity of the internet, has changed what could be called the nature of art. The aura that Benjamin and Adorno spoke of does not exist today because of how easy it is to view works of art, literally at the push of a button. Even though this aura is no longer present the average viewer still looks upon art as if that aura, or godlike presence, is there. Our current method of viewing and interpreting art does not match how art is today, and this leaves the viewer vulnerable to manipulation from people that seek to use images and art as propaganda. Such people are also victim to misinterpreting an image or work of art very easily if they look and interpret in on their own. Since most people are stuck in the old mode of viewing and interpreting art they are not able to receive the intended political message a work of art might be trying to convey, such people need others to guide them to the correct mode of viewing and interpreting so that they can make the transition between where they are and where they want to be. Without a guide, people in power can turn art into propaganda by distorting facts and shaping opinions.


To conclude what has been mentioned before, art can serve a political or moral function by allowing either a society or an individual to transition between where they are now and where they want to be. If such a movement is done by force the change will not take or will result in an even worse state than what existed before. Today most people need a guide, or enlightenment, to understand the political or moral components that an artist may be trying to communicate. This is because, historically, art has had in it an aura because works of art were very unique and hard to view. Modern technology, photography especially, has shifted the way that art works such that the same aura that used to be no longer exists; however, most people still regard art as if it contains such an aura. The aura of old art was present because there was a godlike presence manifested in the art, and this has shifted over the years as well to the point that mere humans are treated in the same godlike manner by common people within social media. Such people are vulnerable to the manipulations of propaganda that is created by people seeking to control others; however, art can escape this fate if a person can be shown the appropriate way to regard art in the modern age. 

Political Art and Propaganda

Referenced Artworks:

Leon Golub, Napalm Head and Mercenaries IV

Peter Saul, Saigon

Pablo Picasso, Guernica
Art Workers Coalition, Q.  And babies? A. And babies.

Robbie Conal, Contra Diction

When first addressing the question of art’s ability to function in the political sphere without being reduced to propaganda, I was conflicted on how I felt. In a previous class on contemporary art, I studied a lot of art that was politically charged. All of these works were held to the standard of high art; indeed many of these works I saw later on the walls of the Smithsonian and the National Gallery. Initially, I didn’t really see a problem or the potential for propaganda in art. At the onset, art was a completely separate sphere than propaganda in my mind. In my mind I thought of propaganda as specific calls to action, things that encouraged or degraded wars or political stances outright. I thought of crass, poorly put together things that told you that your political views were either right or wrong. I use the word thing because they were somewhere between plain statements on a page and art - they were drawings or paintings, yes, but they didn’t quite feel like art.
Political art, on the other hand, was a clear idea for me - or so I thought. It was the Napalm series Leon Golub created in response to the Vietnam war. It was Peter Saul’s Saigon. It was Guernica by Pablo Picasso. Pablo Picasso certainly would never create something so base as propaganda. These were works of art, they were masterful paintings that had depth - so much depth - and a clear display of talent. But I continued to contemplate these political works that I had encountered in this sphere of fine art. I found that alongside Picasso was Robbie Conal and forces such as the Art Workers Coalition. Now there is no denying the artistic capabilities that are evident in Robbie Conal’s works. However, there is also no denying that a large image of Ronald Reagan with the text “CONTRA DICTION” on it is clearly pointed and dare I say leaning far more towards the realm of propaganda. Just the same, the Art Workers Coalition took war images of dead children and plastered over it excerpts from an interview with an American war official in which he admits that babies were also massacred in My Lai, Vietnam. In this image, Q.  And babies? A. And babies. there is a damning effect that can’t be misread. Upon reflecting on works like this that were clearly acknowledged and some even canonized as art, I began to question where exactly the line was drawn.

The readings which addressed this question started to clear up some of my issues. For me the most convicting and certainly most helpful arguments were that of Schiller; Schiller’s claims that art should be involved in politics helps to further my ideas of political art in fact being fine art. His ideas, however, that politics necessarily need art to further their goals initially bewildered me. Yet, I found that his claims, in their complexity, were in fact supporting my ideas on the political artwork. For example, Q.  And babies? A. And babies. and Saigon both work to show and uncover political ideas and atrocities in a way that words simply could not. By giving an image and deeper meaning to these political situations, I feel that they do have a way of furthering a political cause. And in fact, they way in which they do it is so essential because it is distinct from and more universally resonant than political writing or statistics. Furthermore the part of his analysis which deals with the way things are and ought to be was particularly important to me. The way in which he ascribes art as the releasing or reconciliation of the tension between what things are and what things ought to be is key. In the political art I’ve mentioned so far, the artists are representing the way things are in order to highlight the problematic nature of it and imply the way things ought to be. Through Schiller’s analysis I found that there is certainly a place for political non-propaganda art.

Art's Role in Politics


Can art serve a legitimate moral or political function without being reduced to propaganda?
I think art can serve a moral and political function without being reduced to propaganda. However, I think that when art is employed for solely political goals, its power becomes more known to others and it becomes susceptible to being used for the wrong reasons, namely to mislead and manipulate people. Thus, I think that art should stay far away from politics but be used as a motivator to act morally and to encourage people to create beautiful things in the world. 
In The Symposium, Plato claims that art persuades us without us being able to interrogate it. The beautiful thing is something that appears to us as good or noble, but it appears to us as good without us being able to give reasons as to why we think that it is good. Art produces a belief without reasons for those beliefs. Even though we don’t know why the thing itself is beautiful or produces certain feelings, the beautiful thing motivates us to act. It produces a kind of conviction that makes us think we ought to do something. For Plato, this push to action is reproduction. Why do we reproduce beautiful things or mate with a beautiful person? To make more beautiful things. Schiller sees art’s power to incite certain feelings as well, but because he recognizes arts usefulness or power seems to think that it owes something to politics. 
Schiller thinks that there is a necessary relationship between art and politics because only art can allow politics to achieve its goals, or rather, politics needs art because its incapable of realizing its own ends by political means. He argues that political laws alone can never bring about the good that they intend. They can posit the goal but the actual change has to come about from other means. Even the best intentioned laws aren’t fulfilled because people don’t buy into it. A good example of this was the French Revolution. They had a good goal in mind and it was right for the whole but the vision failed because they didn’t have a way to move toward the end they sought. Art however, can make us want a particular end. Art can be the transition from where a group is politically and where they want to be, and Schiller argues that it must be that transition. What is problematic here in my opinion is that art can transition to the wrong goals and to the wrong ends. Yes, it can do good, and it can motivate us and encourage us to do better and be better, but it can also do the opposite. Because, as we’ve discussed numerous times before, the beautiful things leave us with conviction that we can’t explain, I think it’s dangerous in the hands of politicians because it leaves room for people to be convicted without knowing what they’re fighting for. 
Schiller argues that the artist shouldn’t serve its age or not be a mignon to political wills but how can it be involved in politics and not do that? Art can be a great tool for the good and can be a positive mode of motivation, but it can also mislead us. A good example of this is the “Be Essential” posters on campus, and overall I would say that the posters are a positive, good thing. However, are all of those posters the picture of reality at Rhodes college? No. Art is a great tool, but it can be used on both ends of the spectrum to encourage good or bad behavior. The other end of the spectrum here is propaganda. Propaganda is by definition, material that attempts to motivate action or to persuade with the intention of motivating actions, particularly when that involves manipulation or deception. Now all art can be manipulative, but it’s when that manipulation motivates someone by deception that it becomes problematic. 
Adorno and Benjamin both see art’s power, as does Schiller; however, Benjamin and Adorno seem to think that likelihood of art being reduced to propaganda is increasing with modern technology, particularly film. Because of our ever increasing technological capabilities, it’s becoming easier and easier to manipulate people and mass audiences at that. Film manipulates scenes to suggest a reality or to evoke feeling in its viewers. However, the total shot can be changed by a twist of the camera. Devereaux was very hesitant of film because she argued that a male gaze was projected onto the viewer. Benjamin and Adorno seem to be recognizing the capability that film has to project anything at all onto the viewer, positive or negative. 
Benjamin, feels that art has moved from being authentic to something that is reproducible and almost devalued. He argues that art used to have an aura, a certain authenticity because you could only see it then and there. Now, art is more technical and we don’t need artistic genius, yet we’re still treating art as if it still possessed that special aura. He argues that with film and new age art, the picture is broken into pieces. Where as in theatre, you needed the whole, with film you can break it into parts to manipulate it. He goes on to say that there is a loss of identification between the spectator and the actor, and that all of this produces a destruction of the aura of the image because there is no distance in film as there is in theatre. Adorno sees film similarly, and sees modern art as a move from ritual to free-floating power. Because it is free, art is now free to take on anything it wants. Adorno and Benjamin are afraid that political agendas will manipulate us because we still see art as god-like things when really, genius no longer exists. Anybody can create dazzling spectacles, and we need to recognize this and think of art differently. 
I tend to agree with both Benjamin and Adorno. Because we have the ability to manipulate images even more so than we ever have before, art is particularly susceptible to being used for negative purposes such as propaganda. Thus, I think it is imperative that as Devereaux said, we keep in mind that we’re being manipulated as we watch something, analyze the manipulation and make our own decisions. The problem is that not many people have the time or even think to analyze a piece of art or a movie, and often take it at face value. Because of this, art can be a very dangerous tool if used politically because people might be brainwashed into following a particular idea without pausing to analyze what their viewing or to account for the manipulation of the piece they are seeing. Thus, I think it’s very difficult for artwork to be used politically without negatively impacting people and deceiving a mass audience for pure political goals. 

Can art serve a legitimate moral or political function without being reduced to propaganda?

As Schiller notes, art has the power to bridge the gap between the factical world as it is and the ethical ideal of the world as it ought to be, and it can inspire us to act in ways that mere knowledge or commands. In the modern world, where images and songs are available to us instantaneously through the use and mediation of technology, this power to inspire action takes on a different form than it did in the past. Benjamin and Adorno are right to be wary of technology’s influence on art and subsequently on culture as well, for the eminence of technology in the production and distribution of artworks makes them susceptible to the control and exploitation of those who control the technology of creation and distribution. The fear that these two have is that art’s power to inspire will be manipulated by the media and/or the government to control the population. However, in as much as they are used as propaganda, works cease to be artful, since they are being used as equipment and they are exhaustible. For art to exist as art, it can still serve the exhortative function that Schiller sees while not being totally exhausted.
            The Heideggerian analysis of the nature of artwork reveals how it can come to have this inspirational power. In viewing the Van Gogh painting of the peasant’s shoes which Heidegger analyzes, we are made aware of the essences of things-in-themselves (namely the shoes in this instance) beyond what we are normally capable. In looking at an actual pair of shoes, we try to understand what they are made of and how they appear to our senses. In using a pair of shoes, we have an implicit knowledge of what the shoes are and how they function, but we are not consciously aware of this. In using the shoes, as with all equipment, we do not know them while we use them.
In viewing artful representation, however, we try to grapple with the shoes in a new way. How did they get there? Who used them?  This process of questioning leads us to understand the connection between the factical and the transcendent aspects of the artwork. On the one hand, it calls to mind the thingly nature of the shoes, but on the other, it shows how the shoes are more than just the matter. According to Heidegger, artwork reveals truth, but not through facts about the world. Rather, artwork allows for an “unconcealedness” of being in the world and the tension between the brute matter of the earth and the world which our perceptions construct upon it. This αληθεια aligns with what Schiller sees as the power of artwork, particularly if we allow for the free play of the viewer’s imagination which Kant emphasizes. Artistic truth as unconcealing provides a meeting place for what is and what ought to be that is available for the consideration of the viewer. Simply looking at things as they are is not enough to make this connection from the “is” to the “ought,” nor is the application of equipment and tools able to cause this awareness.
The nature of propaganda, then, is not that of artwork. If artwork opens up the possibilities of the world and Being, propaganda seeks to conceal in order to effect change through deception. If we understand propaganda as “material that attempts to motivate action or to persuade/produce convictions with the intent to motivate to action, particularly where it employs deception or manipulation,” then it defies the nature of art in so much as it is used to push a particular agenda or direct the minds of the audience. If it obscures the relation of the factical earth and the world or attempts to forcibly conceal certain things, then it is not artwork, for it is not an unconcealing. Further, propaganda does not allow for the free play of the imagination, but rather seeks to confine it to a certain method.

The problems of propaganda come from a failure to recognize the intention behind them. Rather than an intention to create (in a general sense), the propagandist intends to convince and control, and in so far as these intentions are not clear to the viewer, then the propaganda is successful. However, if the viewer is aware of the agenda behind it, then the work could be viewed artfully. For instance, in the modern era, we may view “Triumph of the Will” without the feeling that we should accept the Nazi regime. We can view it as an unconcealing; we see the actual events and people of the Nuremburg rallies, and yet we can also understand there is some story coming across to us from the filmmaker, and we can ask ourselves the same sorts of questions as we do before the Van Gogh painting. In this way, propaganda can be diffused, provided that we as viewers are able to understand the ploys used for convincing and then move past them to exercise our own imaginative free play.

Wednesday, November 19, 2014

Authors, Artworks, and Their Ill-Defined Borders

Intuitively, my reaction to the question “what role does the artist take in shaping an artwork” is: an essential one. This I say, considering that without the artist, the work and all subsequent interpretations of it would not exist. However, we have seen that various arguments of anti-intentionalist critics and thinkers complicate our initial concept of who is involved in the creation of an artwork. Carroll does an excellent job of fleshing those arguments out and offering counter-arguments of his own, however, I felt that he took the easy way out in part by positing that we can discount the artist’s explicit intentions by assuming that they don’t apply if they don’t immediately seem reasonable. Though Carroll’s intention with this position is to provide a moderate alternative to rejecting undue authorial input without resorting to anti-intentionalism, he doesn’t leave room for the influence of post-modernism and contemporary performance art, which I find surprising considering the paper of his that we read was originally published in 1992.

If anti-intentionalism raises the question of where the work of art ends (in the experience of the viewer/reader/listener rather than the hands of the artist), than contemporary performance art ups the ante considerably. Pieces such as Warhol’s “Eating a Hamburger” (itself only a piece of the full art object consisting of much of his life) illustrate the fact that our notion of what constitutes an artwork has always been, and continues to be flimsy. Some insight indirectly offered by Wollheim by way of his specific definition of artworks (in this case, pieces of music or theater which exist not as any particular instance of performance or in the score or the script, but as an ideal performance never realized) is the fact that “the artwork” may never be what it appears to be, giving us reason to wonder not only whether, as the anti-intentionalist would wish us to, an artwork is merely the work as related to its creator or a conjunction of the work with its many diverse and potential interpretations, but also whether an artwork’s “borders” are defined by traditional means or whether those means are being transgressed against in the construction of an even more complex artwork (regardless of who is responsible for its construction).

If, understanding that our criteria for artworks are inherently loose, we allow contemporary performance art to be a concern, we must always be aware of the artist as a sort of architect who directs the builders (experiencers/participators) in the construction of the artwork. The artwork cannot be evaluated as only the blueprints, nor only as the material without form, but must be as inclusive of the input of the creator as possible with respect to the input of the experiencer. Nehamas’ “postulated author” presents a valuable tool for retaining the influence of authorship while acknowledging the reality and power of readership. By positing an author who is in a sense communicable via interpretation, the postulated author becomes even more than the “writer” (to use Nehamas’ terminology), serving as a nexus of possible authorial intentions. The utility for this usage where the author’s intention cannot be known is readily apparent, but it also has usage for situations in which the author’s input and intention are explicit. For example, in the case of the sculptor who insists that her sculpture is pink instead of blue (although the sculpture is measurably blue), the actual sculptor’s intent can serve as a tool which expands or contracts the scope of the “postulated sculptor’s” possible intentions, but understanding that the true sculptor cannot know the full depths of their subconscious by which they could express a definitive intent for a piece, the “postulated sculptor” serves as a much better gauge than the actual sculptor (alternatively, we could conceive of the artwork not as merely the physical sculpture, but the sculpture in relation to contradictory remarks made by the artist).


As a result of these lines of criticism, a new artistic mentality is arising in artists themselves, although strains of it have been present for centuries, that they, the artists, are not responsible for imparting meaning to their work. This doesn’t just apply to interpretive meaning though, it also applies to original meaning, the meaning which would presumably exist as a teleological map which the artist would follow in the process of creation. Dr. Butler’s sculptures exhibit strains of this thought, not to mention he himself expressed such concepts. He speaks of pieces “finishing themselves,” of “working out their own conclusions” (paraphrasing here, of course). The carving of the plaster molds was not explicitly directed. The artist, at the end of the process, is in the same position as the viewer encountering the artwork for the first time, employing the tool of a “postulated artist” in order to interpret the unknown workings of the subconscious in interplay with matters of chance. In short, the artist plays an instrumental role in the existence of an artwork but hardly more than the experiencer, both attempting to touch upon a perceived wellspring of creative possibilities.

For Your Consideration:

Sunday, November 16, 2014

Power of Photographs

http://www.theatlantic.com/features/archive/2014/08/the-war-photo-no-one-would-publish/375762/

This is really relevant to the philosophy club meeting about why photos tend to / tend not to change the way we think...