"Good Taste"

“Good Taste”

Good taste is a specious concept which, if to be taken as something which exists beyond the nominal, requires not merely a standard of taste but a normativity based on this rule which would seem to be able to decisively state whether or not a particular individual makes good use of the standard or not. Despite the guise of some kind of universality of an object’s beauty, or ugliness, which seems to allow for such normative claims to be rendered as meaningful, as noted by Kant, aesthetic judgments are themselves produced out a “disinterested interest” which occurs in absence of an appeal to a concept or any other feeling of pleasure derived from it. This creates an unprejudiced judgment but, in contrast to Hume’s thesis, this lack of prejudice exists completely separate of the education of the observer of the art object. This is not to say that an educated taste cannot be applied to an aesthetic judgment but that it is after the fact and ad hoc. The art object appealed to the observer’s taste before a requirement of the object to be of “good” taste entered into the equation (“good” taste here means any sort of normative claim or standard against which the art object is contrasted – what is considered using a “critical eye”). The thing appeals to the observer before a concept is attached to it. The object is simply “this,” and “this thing is beautiful” or “this thing is ugly” (or some degree thereof) are the immediate judgments which are made and can then be extrapolated to establish a particular pattern which we may call an individual’s particular “taste.” This is why is it that even those critics who are said to have the most refined and sophisticated senses of taste, due either to a natural talent or education, within their field can maintain “guilty pleasures” which they know to be completely outside the realm of “good” taste but nonetheless enjoy as appealing to their own taste.

Even in light of the adoption of Hume’s notion that taste, specifically “good taste”, is a composite of the preferences and predispositions exposited by qualified critics, there are repeated occurrences of objects which are otherwise un-notable being pleasurable to a majority of observers even when it is known that the object does not qualify as being particularly tasteful (this is not an occurrence in which a particular thing has fallen out of fashion or is anachronistic as Hume himself provides an account for the changing of taste based in cultural and time contexts, but regards actual objects seated within their time and place which still fall into this category). The attractiveness, then, of the application of a sort of principle of taste is due to the sense of the normative character of aesthetic judgments; there is some feeling that others should share in the purely subjective judgments which are made about an art, or aesthetic, object. Further, authority is placed in those who have the highest degree of exposure and education in particular domains because there is a sense they are much more qualified to make aesthetic judgments which would be true if there were, in fact, a real principle or law of taste which could discern good taste from bad. However, without such a principle, appeals to critics due to their experience is a sort of surrendering of agency to another – an attempt to have them inform a subjective judgment by placing it into a quasi-objective realm – instantiated in something such as a review – where the merits (e.g. being produced using good technique or effectively making a certain reference in a clever way) of an aesthetic object render whether the object is appealing or not almost entirely regardless of subjective experience.

            In the face of this relativistic understanding of taste it is difficult to argue whether the discernment of taste is a meaningful ability, and arguably, it is not in of itself. For one to have an understanding of their own preferences is a desirable quality in both others and oneself but it does not have a meaningful input, in of itself, into the world because each individual has their own taste which is only truly curated by them (which is why it can be so exciting to meet someone who seems to share in the same taste – it is not simply confirmation but a feeling of finding oneself in another). The discernment of taste, then, is given meaning through socio-cultural constructs which place certain individuals as authorities of taste, and more encompassingly, inform not merely what objects in that particular context are in “good” taste (i.e. in fashion) but how taste should be conceived of altogether. There is an inter-subjective agreement brought about by cultural conditioning. This is what causes so much wonder about individuals who defy these cultural conditions and seem to operate under an entirely different understanding of the world, at least aesthetically, as a result. Similarly, these same sort of constraints are what causes aesthetic objects which transcend multiple socio-cultural contexts (constantly being regarded as beautiful) to seem so powerful and impressive (it may even provide further momentum to this transcendent ability and perpetuate the ability outside of the object’s own power – the wonder that it has made it this far disposes observers to lift it up so it may go farther).

            In summation, “good” taste is a socially derived concept which exploits an appeal to authority in attempt to be meaningful. Unfortunately, taste is, in of itself, a relative trait which differs from each individual to the next and is only able to find any semblance of uniformity in the conformity to socio-cultural contexts. However, in closing, this does not mean that tastes do not have an emotional component. Hume touched on the sentimental component which informs taste, and this is where taste may find its meaning – not as an informed, critical appreciation but as a sort of social-emotional bond (at the very least a very real set of predispositions which could be, though most likely not fully, evaluated by inquiry into their relations with one another and in reference to other people). And so, taste may not be meaningful in law-like way but it may still have meaning as a very real concept which is impactful upon people.