Thursday, September 11, 2014

Blog 1 - final

When I initially read the question, “to what extent is representation an essential function of artwork?” I did not even know where to begin. At first I thought along very platonic lines that art was always trying to represent a specific image. Plato’s understanding of representation as a sort of imitation, however, did not capture the entire spirit of representation for me. I felt that Plato’s representation could not capture what made surrealist art, for instance, considered art. Instead I argued that representation had multiple meanings when it came to art. The audience of artwork and the artist had their own sets of representations and ideas that factored into the declaration of something as art. This argument lacked clarity because I did not fully understand what representation meant and what it entailed for artwork. After reading Benedetto Croce’s Aesthetics, I believe that I now have a better and more robust understanding of representation and its role in artwork. Representation is essential to artwork, but what it represents has many qualifications.
            Plato in the Republic tries to argue that art is the production of images and these images are independent objects. Art is simply mimetic and that makes art extremely dangerous and fallible. As Plato claims, an artist must not know anything about the actuality or form of the thing that they are trying to represent. In fact for the painter, in order to create a painting, they must ask the audience to see what is not actually in front of them (i.e. a canvas with paint on it), but an image within in a 2 dimensional framework. By asking the audience to view the painting this way, the painter is making the audience step away from their intellect and reason and view the painting in the realm of feeling. For Plato, feeling is a base form of thinking and does not know what is best for the body or soul. This definition of artwork leaves representation as simple and purely imitative. While I think that imitation does serve the purpose of some artwork and can help develop an artist’s skills, a truly amazing work of art does not leave the audience impressed with the simplicity of the artworks imitation. Great artwork makes the audience feel something, and it is precisely in this way that Croce talks about art.
            Croce argues that art cannot simply be imitation, as Plato would have it. He postulates that, “if painting were the imitation or reproduction of a given object, it would be, not art, but something mechanical and practical” (271). Purely imitative artwork would imply that eventually no new works of art would be able to be created. Unless the essence of art is imitation, which some try and argue is the case (especially in literature), then art must necessarily have some other realm of judgment. This other area of judgment comes from the “contemplation of feeling” or “pure intuition” (271). This contemplation of feeling, while it is not the same activity as many other forms of thought, like philosophy, history, or science, it is a mental activity nonetheless. For that reason, artwork is also judged in combination with the other mental activities. He claims that judging art without any knowledge of its background is inappropriate, but neither is reading art from a purely historical approach. While the latter leaves out the real meaning of the artwork, the former drives out the only thing that makes it art (281). So for Croce, artwork is not a representation of some imitation, but rather a representation of some contemplation of feeling.
            I agree with Croce for the most part. I think that he does a good job of addressing my issues with the limited understanding of art that Plato puts forward. The most important thing that I believe his argument offers is the idea that art is an a priori concept. He claims that, “an a priori concept does not exist by itself, but only in the individual products which it creates” (274). This theory really ties representation into artwork nicely. In order for something to be art, it must represent some form of the a priori concept but also the relative understanding of what art is in the world. For instance, a self-photograph may not be considered art if it is a form of identification like a driver’s license, but if it refers to the self-image and the a priori concept of art it can be considered a work of art. While he does not name it specifically in the text, Croce also seems to point out that art requires creativity. When he makes the claim that art is not necessarily about having the tools to duplicate an image, he implies that it takes creativity and emotion to move the image into the realm of artwork. I too agree with the statement that creativity is an important component of art, but I do not believe that imitation lacks all creativity. Landscape paintings, for example, are imitative, but they can still capture an emotion or feeling that leads to “pure intuition.”

            I still believe that representation is an essential function of art. It represents an image and an a priori concept of what art is. This helps explain why what is considered a form of art has changed over the years and will still change. The artist has the ability to create a work that can represent something but also that refers to the idea of art. This combination of representation is what creates the “feeling of contemplation” that Croce discusses, but is also known as the emotional swell that the audience feels when looking at a truly amazing work of art.

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