In my first response, I said that I do think representation is an essential function of artwork. When I was writing my first response, I questioned (although I did not include this in my actual paper), how is this view reconcilable with the idea that a piece of art might represent something different to different people? I believe now that the idea of recognition reconciles these points and, in terms of the essays, at least in part reconciles Plato’s and Croce’s views.

I agree mostly with Plato’s idea that artwork is imitation. Even if one doesn’t accept the grand idea of the “forms” (which I don’t think I do), these is still the basic idea that an object has an essence that makes it what it is. A couch, using Plato’s example, isn’t a couch unless it has the essential properties of a couch. Even if there is no form of “couch” in nature, a couch still has certain essential properties. Without the idea of the forms, it would be hard to say that an actual couch is an imitation of something in the true sense of the word. (How can something imitate something that doesn’t already exist?) However, the couch still is an imitation in the sense that a couch holds the essential qualities of a couch as well as other qualities that are inessential to the couch. For example, say a particular couch is the color green. If the couch wasn’t green, it would still be a couch. In this sense, the couch is representative of the essential properties of a couch in the sense that it is those essential properties plus something else. Whether or not this is really representation, I agree with Plato that an artwork is a representation of a particular instantiation. In my first response, I wrote about what makes something like a painting of a tree art while an actual tree isn’t art. At the time, what constitutes Plato’s point of view didn’t occur to me, but now that I’ve read about it, it makes sense. An actual tree, for example, produces oxygen. A painting of a tree, however, looks like a tree but does not produce oxygen. What makes a painting of a tree different from a tree is, at least in part, that the tree fully functions as a tree while the painting of a tree does not. In my first response, I made the point that no piece of artwork can represent nothing; it has to represent something that exists or some combination of things that exist. With this in mind, Plato’s viewpoint makes sense. Art represents something without actually reproducing it. In this sense, representation is an essential function of artworks.

            In my first response, I also wrote about how artworks might represent something or some feeling within the artist. I said that, at the very least, the artist chooses to represent something in art because he or she thinks that that thing should be reproduced in art. This implies that art is possibly both (1) a representation of some idea and (2) a reflection of some feeling within the artist. Croce, however, (if I’m interpreting his work correctly) seems to believe that works of art are not reflections or representations of something within the artist but instead are an essential part of whatever the artist was feeling or thinking of when he or she created the artwork. He writes, “An image that does not express, that is not speech, song, drawing, painting, sculpture or architecture – speech at least murmured to oneself, song at least echoing within one’s own breast… is an image that does not exist” (275). This suggests that artwork is not representation but instead is a part of something original. Furthermore, if art and the meaning of art cannot be separated, this implies that a piece of art represents no one given thing because the same image might awaken different thoughts and meanings in different people. I’m inclined to agree with Croce’s views. However, I think that, in line one of Gadamer’s main points, Croce’s implications that representation is not an essential function of artwork and Plato’s belief that representation is an essential function can be reconciled. To me, Gadamer’s idea of recognition serves as a compromise between the two positions.

            Even if the meaning of art is tied in some way to the mind of the person creating it or observing it, there is still an element of representation that is a part of the artwork. For example, if an artist paints a tree, his or her idea of the painting and the way it’s beautiful might exist inside the artist’s mental processes. The piece of artwork might not just be a representation of a tree; it might really be an essential part of the artist’s feelings. However, this doesn’t change the fact that the artist’s idea of tree reflects something that already exists. The art work might be something in itself, an essential part of the creator’s functioning, but a certain aspect of the creator’s functioning comes from the creator being familiar with what a tree is and incorporating the idea into his own process. The idea of a tree is also relevant to the way the observer views the artwork. The observer is essentially able to recreate the artwork in his or her head because he or she draws some connection between the art and what he or she already thinks/feels. For instance, say a particular observer of the painting of a tree saw the painting without knowing what a tree is and without having any inner associations between trees and everything else. This observer wouldn’t be able to feel or think anything about the painting of a tree; he or she might just think that the painting is of colors arranged in a certain way. The piece of artwork might be tied to everything that goes into the people who create it or recreate it, but this necessitates that they recognize the piece of art as reflecting something they have already seen or know of. Thus, I think art at least necessarily represents something other than itself in the sense that in art, people need to be able to recognize something else.