Reflection 2

When assessing necessary qualities of art, it is - like many things in philosophy - entirely dependant of who you ask. This of course is for a variety of reasons ranging from the things that the philosopher already holds to be true to the time and culture in which they are writing. Of the philosophers we’ve read so far, it is fairly clear that the time period they are living in is affecting the way they write philosophy on art. The further our readings get from ancient times, the more complex and appreciative the philosophical study of art becomes.

In the times of Plato, the cultural perception of the artist is completely estranged from the modern perception of the artist. Due to Plato’s time period and station in society, his writing reflects the idea that the philosopher was thought highly of while the artist was merely a laborer. In the Republic, Plato looks down upon many of life’s pursuits for the reason that they are of material means, as opposed to intellectual pursuits. There is reason the philosophers are philosopher kings in Plato’s writings. With conceptions of art and artists being such, it is understandable that Plato’s account of art is that it is purely mimetic, that is completely representational of something outside themselves. In fact, he says that of these imitative arts you can’t even be say that they “are” or “are not” for they simply “mean to be”. Plato does not even admit their independent status beyond meaning to be what they are an image of. Furthermore, he believes that it is a representation of a representation, in so far as, the artist needn’t even understand the form of an object in order to produce an image of the physical thing. Given this particular portion of his writing, it is fair to say that it is not simply that art is necessarily representational, but it is also typically a representation twice removed from the thing (the form) it is imitating.

When reading Plato, many may try to counter with claims and appeals to abstract art, which is a valid concern. However, it is important to note that for Plato, much of what we consider to be art, especially much of modern art, is not within the realm of his definition of art. To find a consideration of art that is modern and contemporary and includes abstractions, we look to the last two of our readings in this section. First we turn to Croce who argues that it is not at all a necessary function of art to be representative. He even goes on to say that a mimetic reading of art would reduce art to the mechanical and practical, which is in some ways very similar to Plato’s read on art. The difference here, however, is that Plato believes that this is the true nature of art, while Croce believes this a reduction which does not do proper justice to art. Croce’s higher opinion of art, evident in his arguments just presented, were likely a product of his time. Croce argues not only that art is above meer mimesis, but also that there is in fact an actually need for art and the intuition it embodies. Furthermore, Croce’s idea that art is the pure intuition just furthers his claims that art is not necessarily representational. He takes all things that are felt images and pure intuitions of things to be art, including the abstract and nonobjective.

Our third reading, Gadamer, has a somewhat similar approach to this problem of representation. He first mentions that in the 18th century imitation was deemed inadequate as a necessary function of art and was replaced in some ways with expression. In talking about expression, Gadamer cites certain intensity and sincerity - which I must admit is a bit troubling, if not simply confusing to me. Much of Gadamer’s writing is in direct response to other philosophers, including Plato, with whom he disagrees with strongly in so far as he thinks art has it’s own truth value despite being “twice removed” from Plato’s thoughts on the truth. Gadamer also dabbles in Aristotelian ideas of recognition, which he cites as the process of seeing things in terms of their permanent and essential qualities. While recognition of the truth seems like a fine solution, we run into the same problem we’ve had all along, that is, at a certain point recognition lends itself to imitation and representation. Gadamer quickly recovers by noting that this does not include much of modern and nonobjective art. In finding an answer no where else, Gadamer attempts to return to the idea of mimesis as a way through to find the necessary function of art. He notes that we are able to broaden and open up the definition of the word mimesis. In opening up the definition to a wider range of things Gadamer notes that it is possible to mimic the ratios and math of things. He borrows this idea from Pythagorean, from whom Plato borrowed his ideas on mimesis according to Gadamer. But his idea is that the general ratios of art can be seen as mimetic. But in the end, his final thoughts are that it simply does not matter. It is irrelevant. For Gadamer, whether or not a work of art is objective does not matter as long as it produces a type of spiritual order and energy. This comes from Pythagorean ideas that ratios are able to create order, and thus Gadamer does not believe that representation is a necessary function of art, but rather the spiritual energy that produces order is.  

In the end, I would say that though there are differing opinions across the board, in this age with the context of modern art and abstraction being so highly regarded, representation is not a necessary function of art. Though, the explanations of this differ, as well as the things with which writers replace representation, it is certainly - at least among our readings - not the necessary function. While one reader - Plato - disagreed with this very much, I believe it was a product of his place in history, just as modern thinkers are confronted with modern art and necessarily have to find a place for it.