Second Reflection on Representation in Art

To what extent is representation an essential function of artworks?

            In any work of art, there is something to be represented, whether or not it is as explicit a representation as the Platonic account of mimesis. As a work of art, whatever is made – whether painting, song, poem, or whatever – is made to be appreciated as whatever it is, and thus it is indicative of something more than just the physical manifestation through which they present themselves. I believe that Gadamer is correct in suggesting that the representational function of art is not to be construed narrowly in a sort of “a = b” relationship, but rather that the representation is of a sense of order and a world unto itself. The Platonic account of mimesis only hints at the full potential of it, and Croce’s ideas about “lyrical intuition” also seem to suggest the validity of Gadamer’s position.

For example, one can look at a painting like a portrait made by Fragonard, which strives to represent an actual human being, and this is done with such skill as it is easily perceptible that the person painted is in fact a reference to some other person out there in the world (for example, his portrait of Diderot). Clearly, this is representation in the strictest sense, for the painting is meant to be of someone, and thus refers to that person. According to Aristotle and Gadamer, the very recognition of this person in the painting as Diderot is what makes the artistic experience. Similarly, the performance of the Oresteia is an artful production not because there are people in masks dancing around on a stage, but because these people are meant to be something other than themselves (i.e. the characters) and are intended to be recognized as such. What makes the depiction artful is the creator’s personal influence, as Croce notes. It is not simply the fact that Diderot or Orestes are rendered for an audience, but the fact that some artist has designed their work in such a way as to express their particular take on these figures. Thus, on the level of objects, representation appears to be an essential function of art.

Looking at less concrete relations between the work of art and the world outside of it may pose some problems. For example, in the painting “Ottimismo e Pessimismo” by Giacomo Balla, there are no figures to pick out that exist in the world like there are in the Fragonard or in the plays of Aeschylus. There are simply geometric figures of black and grey angles and lines and then blue curves. However, this work comes as an expression of the work of a particular artist and becomes encapsulated in the form of the particular painting. And, as Croce notes, the work of art communicates itself through its perception in the mind of the viewer. The “meaning” of the work is thus picked up on by the spectator without the necessity of the artwork picking out some actual entity (for with the nature of the painting, finding something in the world like it would be absurd). Rather, as an entity unto itself, the painting is reflective of a particular mindset of the artist. The title of the work gives a hint to viewing and interpreting the way that the image can convey something more than simply colors and shapes. Thus, the work is representative of something more beyond itself. As Gadamer puts it, it is to be recognized as something other than what it is physically, but as a recollection of something else (perhaps the experiences of the viewer as regards pessimism and optimism). Similarly, if one looks at the Holst’s suite “The Planets,” there representation is in the union of the physical realization that comes across. There is nothing in the melodies that necessarily suggest Mars or Jupiter anymore than the lines and curves suggest pessimism and optimism. Rather, it is the structure of the artist’s thoughts concerning their work that is conveyed through the composition.

Even looking at works in the vein of found art can be seen as, at their core, representational. Take for example Marcel Duchamp’s famous “Fountain.” On the one hand, the physical instantiation is in fact a urinal. On the Platonic account, this isn’t even a work of art because it simply is a thing, not an appearance of a thing. However, its status as a work of art comes not from its creation for utility by the craftsperson, but rather in its presentation by the artist. Duchamp’s move in placing the urinal as a piece of sculpture expresses a feeling on the part of the artist, or Croce’s “lyrical intuition.” And, consequently, the urinal is not to be taken as a urinal, but something else. This is precisely the mimetic effect that Gadamer highlights in discussing artworks: the recognition of the physical thing as something else, not as itself. The painting of Diderot is Diderot, the actor of Orestes is Orestes, the black and blue shapes are pessimism and optimism, the 5/4 composition of horns and drums is Mars. The recognition that accompanies Duchamp’s piece is not as clearly delineated, but nonetheless there is the recognition of the artwork as something other than what it is. This self-contained nature, common to all works of art, is a representation because it creates something more than itself.

The work of art is essentially representational because it is something other than what it is. On the one hand, a painting or a symphony or a poem is a physical presence in some sense, but so are rocks and birdsong. What makes the former art is that they are not simply the physical manifestations of what they are. The artist makes a work such that there is something beyond this level that is meant to be appreciated by others, such that each work becomes not merely a piece of canvas or a jumble of noise, but it becomes a cohesive unity unto itself.