The Essential Nature of Representation

  The concept of representation within artworks is one that goes back to the ancient world – best known under the term “mimesis,” so dubbed by Plato – and as the nature of art and artistic works has changed, has been repeatedly called into question and probed for the veracity of any claim that art does, in fact, refer – specifically the claim that representation, or reference, is essential to art. Hans-Georg Gadamer and Benedetto Croce took up the project of revising a mimetic aesthetic theory in light of contemporary changes in art, and reach seemingly disparate conclusions, but here it shall be argued that in the demarcation so clearly set between the two is not such a hindrance to an informed aesthetic theory, receptive of contemporary and past trends in the arts, and results in the same, final conclusion, that art to some extent does refer – if only it does so to itself as Croce argued, or perhaps, as Gadamer claims, something beyond the work. The meeting ground is in the observer, the one who experiences the art, and here we see that the interactive characterization of art as a mental category by Croce finds a familiar in Gadamer – though it is quite possible neither author would feel that this were so.

            When “mimesis” is referenced in this paper it is best understood as the classical definition, representation, and was described by Plato as the essential quality and function of those artworks which serve no purpose beyond being art (art in a very conventional sense). Throughout this paper, when we talk about art and artworks it will be strictly referring to those which are intended to, or seem to, have no function outside of being art.

            What follows is a sketch of representation as an essential function of art within the bounds of both Croce’s and Gadamer’s aesthetic theories, with respect to the original discrepancies that each author draws on this point.

            Let us begin with a brief outline of the work of Croce, specifically highlighting what are seen as the distinctions between his aesthetics and that of Gadamer. Croce dismisses the notion of art referring to the outside world; those references we find in artworks are divorced from art itself, and in our investigations of them we are not experience the artwork qua art but in some other capacity related to whatever we claim the referent to be. Art is the “contemplation of feeling,” simply put, and all things which fall outside that category are some other thing even though we may argue point at an artwork and claim it still as that thing to which we are referring, if it is not in the capacity of feeling, then we are not referring to the thing as art. Croce further posits that art is its own, particular species of mental activity – not subjugated to any other activity – and, therefore, any mistaken belief that we may understand art qua anything other than art arises from the mental activity of art interacting with other mental activities. This means there is an objective standard for art in so much as anything which is art must affect or cause this particular mental activity, but there remains an intersubjective condition which Croce believes is a function of culture which asserts that context does affect whether something is experienced as art. It should be noted that Croce then goes further to claim that art is presupposed by all other things based of its input on the level of sense perception/image feeling, which is clearly the point most irreconcilable with Gadamer’s account, however, this incommensurability shall be set aside for the time being to focus on Gadamer’s account, and the essential nature of representation in art to follow.

            For the sake of brevity, the main claims of Gadamer’s aesthetics will be enumerated below as concisely as possible. According to Gadamer, art is characterized as phenomenological and not the Kantian notion of a disinterested attachment. However, this experience is, itself, not the focus of aesthetics – as opposed to Croce who believes this is where the study lies – but it is the aspect of objective realities which reveal themselves within it (see Gadamer’s examination of main schools of aesthetics analysis), and therefore, art does, in fact, represent these in itself. Similar to Croce, Gadamer wishes to remove the conflict of who is to fill the role of final arbiter from between the theorist and the creator of art but unlike Croce who removes this conflict of authority by arguing that the two are doing entirely different mental activities which may overlap but are incommensurate, Gadamer brings them together as equal members in the discourse of interpretation which for Gadamer realizes the artwork. In opposition to Croce, Gadamer believes that art presupposes cognitive and linguistic realities which are then revealed through our experience of it (but that this requires study of it in this light and not as merely Croce’s contemplation of feeling).

            With the disparities between the two theories listed above, it would be most interesting to see where these two theories meet and the source they both draw on for qualification – if there is to be one, though I argue there is. Both these theories discuss art as being representative but in astoundingly different capacities. What follows is an examination of a link between these two theories and the role of representation within them.

            Within both of these theories there is an appeal to a cognitive element within the experience of an artwork. For Croce, the experience of art and its contemplation is representative only of itself and is a distinct mental activity, but one informed by the intersubjective component of cultural context which set criteria for what object will activate this particular mental state. For Gadamer, art reveals through it a cognitive reality, something is represented to us which we recognize, given the wealth of knowledge we already have, and we use our preexisting knowledge to examine the artwork. The commonality here is the presence of a cognitive component which in neither theory allows art to be divorced entirely from our other cognitive activities and knowledge. Even for Croce, who seeks to set art in its own category, art remains interactive without clearly set borders between it and other mental activities. To unpack this, we can go one step further, and recognize that which to both Croce and Gadamer refer is a set of background beliefs (which includes background knowledge though it is not limited to knowledge in the conventional sense). For both theories, art is actually presupposed by these beliefs. After all, that which follows is dependent upon what is given. Even further, I assert, that the function of these background beliefs acts the same in both theories, at least initially – prior to the contemplation of the art itself. To elucidate, in order for any observer to recognize an art object as art it must conform to their belief about what art is. For Croce this is intersubjectively defined, but we can understand this as a cultural condition which establishes a predisposition to view certain objects as art and others as not give one’s up-brining. For Gadamer, it functions much the same but he does not emphasize the intersubjectivity as necessary, but rather seems to push an individualistic approach which holds that the particular set of background beliefs possessed by an individual will greatly affect whether they view a certain object as art and how they view it. Gadamer admits, however, that art may affect these presuppositions, and we, ourselves, can see how even in his theory there is room for a sort of intersubjective conditioning in the form of conformity to particular standard promoted by one’s culture. To return to the point at hand, however, these background beliefs not only cause one to  recognize an artwork as art (or dismiss it as something else) but in both theories affect what a person will see represented within an artwork. For Croce a person may see a multiplicity of overlaps from history, literature, science, and so on; or perhaps just recognize it as art representing art. For Gadamer, a person will be actively engaged in find “familiar’ things represented within the work or risk the work being unintelligible and possibly dismissed from the category of art. What is important here is that for both theories, representation remains essential. A person must recognize some representation as existing, an ability which is informed by the background beliefs that person has when viewing an art object, even if the only representation recognized is that of the art representing itself, the highly abstract, or supposedly “no-thing” at all.

            In summation, therefore, we find that while it would be foolish to say that both theories are commensurate, but we can recognize the essential role of representation within artworks for both theories in reference to our background beliefs which we hold even in our experience of art. Our background beliefs inform our ability to recognize art as art by recognizing what is represented in art that makes it so.